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NOTES AND COMMENTS
on the statute which would create litigation? This is not another attempt to
eliminate litigation where it will vindicate just causes; but it is an attempt to
render justice where it is due. It would seem that spouses who need this kind
of insurance coverage should be required to obtain a policy which has an express provision relating thereto.
Richard F. Griffin

NOTE: DEFAMATION VIA TELEVISION AD LIB; LIBEL AND
SLANDER DISTINCTIONS
On a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging a cause of action in libel for a
television commentator's ad ib. Held: Motion denied; a telecast of defamatory
matter not read from a prepared script constitutes libel and not slander. Shor v.
Billingsley.'
Defamation consists of the torts of libel and slander, libel, generally speaking,
being publication by written or printed words of unprivileged, false and defama2
tory matter, while slander is publication of the above matter by spoken words.
3
Libel is actionable without proof of damages, while slander is actionable only if
there is proof of special damages, 4 viz: a pecuniary loss, 5 unless the defamation is
within the narrow category known as slander per se. Imputation of unchastity to
a woman, 6 imputation of an indictable offense involving moral turpitude, 7 imputation of a loathsome disease s and imputation affecting one in his trade, business
or office,9 are the only spoken words which are actionable per--se.
Snyder v. Andrews' 0 established the principle that a letter read in the
2
presence of another is libel. Although criticized,"' this holding has been followed.'
1. 158 N. Y. S. 2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
2. GAITLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL ACTION, 1 (2d ed. 1929); ODGERS,
LIBEL AND SLANDER, I (6th ed. 1929); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §558, §568 (1) (2)
(1938).
3. Tlorley and Lord Kerney, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §569 (1938).
4. E.g., Torres v. Hunter, 150 App. Div. 798, 135 N. Y. Supp. 332 (2d Dep't
1912).
5. E.g., Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill 309 (N. Y. 1842); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §575,
comment b (1938).
6. E.g., Biggerstoff v. Zimmerman, 108 Colo. 194, 114 P. 2d 1098; N. Y. R.
CIv. PRAc. 97. Contra,Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Ore. 242, 191 Pac. 502 (1920).
7. E.g., Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188 (N. Y. 1809).
8. E.g., Williams v. Holdredge, 22 Barb. 396 (N. Y. 1854).
9. E. g., Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N. Y. 75, 111 N. E. 2d 214 (1953).
10. 6 Barb. 43 (N. Y.1849).
11. Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 300, 73 N. E, 2d 30, 32 (1947) (concurring opinion); Osburn v. Thomas Boulter & Son, [1930] 2 K. B. 226, 231, 236
(dictum); Meldrum v. Australian 'Broadcasting Co., [1932] Vict. L. R. 425.
12. Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 73 N. E. 2d 30 (1947); Bander v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N. E. 2d 595 (1943); Peterson v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 72 Minn. 41, 74 N. W. 1022 (1898); RESTATEMENT,
ToRTS §568, comment e.
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Based upon this determination, defamation by radio and television is held to be
libel if read from a script.' 3 However, such defamation has been held to be only
14
slander if not read from a script.
The historical explanation of the distinction between libel and slander based
on form, that is, whether oral or written, is the amalgamation of the common law
action of defamation and criminal libel of the Star Chamber proceedings of the
16th and 17th centuries where the wrong was the writing itself. 15 The present
justification for this distinction is based on the grounds that that which is written
shows greater malice and is capable of greater mischief because it is more durable
and is therefore capable of greater dissemination.'r Because television and radio
reach millions of people, some courts have intimated that defamation by the relatively new media is a new tort, similar to libel in mischief because of the area of
dissemination, and similar to slander in its form. 17 From this intimation writers
have suggested that because, with respect to mischief, radio defamation is similar
to libel, it should be governed by the rules of libel, that is actionable per se,
whether or not read from a script.'" It has also been proposed that defamation by
radio is really conduct because a voice is heard, not automatically, but only through
mechanical operations of radio technicians.' From this, it has been concluded
that radio defamation, similar to other defamatory conduct,2 0 is libel-slander
being restricted to defamation by unassisted oral speech.
Whenever radio defamation is held to be actionable without proof of a pecuniary loss, no matter what formal reasoning is used, it is this writer's opinion
that strongly influencing this decision is the factor of the large area of dissemin13. Hartman v. Winchell, supra note 12 (radio); Sorenson v. Wood, 123
Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932) (radio);Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
205 Misc. 357, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (television); RESTATEMIENT,
TORTS §568, comment f (1938) (radio). Contra, Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., supra note 11. (defamation by radio, read from a script held to be
slander).
14. Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S. D. N. Y. 1949) (television);
Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937) aff'd, 253
App. Div. 887, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938) (radio).
15. De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125, a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1609); Edwards
v. Wooten, 12 Co. Rep. 35, 77 Eng. Rep. 1316, 1317 (1655). For the history, see
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUm. L. REV.
546 (1903), 4 COLUM. L. REv. 33 (1904); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §568, comment b
(1938).
16. Pollard v. Lyons, 91 U. S. 225, 235 (1875); Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y.
36, 39, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1931) ("....
[Tlhe sting to writing is its permanence
of form.").
17. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 43, 8 A. 2d 302,
310 (1939); Irwin 'v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127 (1938); Kelley v. Hoffman,
137 N. J. L. 695, 61 A. 2d 143, 145 (1948).
18. Comment, 12 ORE. L. REv. 149 (1932); comment, 17 ORE. L. Rsv. 314
(1937).
19. Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio, 19 MINN.L. REV.
611, 639 (1935).
20. Vold, op. cit. supra note 19 at 641 n. 88. (E.g., motion pictures, effigy,
signs, pictures).
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ation. 21 To state that radio defamation is conduct and therefore is libel is either
an error-because libel is based not on the grounds that it is conduct, but rather
2 2because there is, unlike the spoken work, a form which is capable of performance
-or is too technical a ground upon which to rest. To state that radio defamation
is a new tort is a fiction. Radio and television are only new methods of disseminating defamatory matter which if held to be slander point to the conclusion that,
".... the law of defamation.., is as a whole absurd in theory and very
23
often mischievous in its practical operation.
The foundation of the action of defamation whether libel or slander is in the
injury done to reputation in the estimation of others. 24 Therefore, to say, that one
may recover if the defamation is read from a script, even though unknown to the
listener, but may not recover if an ad lib, is unrealistic. 25 The reasons given for
the distinction between libel and slander-greater malice and greater injury to
reputation because of permanence-are not necessarily true. It does not always
follow that because something is permanent, it ipso facto has greater circulation
and therefore causes greater injury, for often times spoken words reach more
people than does a confidential letter. Nor is it always true that that which is written
shows greater malice, the theory being that a person thinks before writing, while
he speaks spontaneously without thought. In any event, malice is not essential to
liability in the first instance. 26 Even if the reasons used in justification are valid,
they should not go to whether one has a cause of action-whether one may
recover at all for inujry-but only to the extent of the injury to one's reputation
27
and how much he may recover.
The distinction between libel and slander is based solely on form, that is,
whether the defamation is something which is capable of permanence. Defamation
via radio and television adds strength to the criticism of the distinction last noted,
but does not invoke any new substantive arguments. This writer believes that if
defamation by radio and television is to be libel, it is not to be justified by the
21. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §568 (3) (1938) recognizes that the area of dissemination is one criteria in determining whether a particular defamation is libel
or slander.
22. The cases cited by Vold, supra, note 19, do not support his contention.
E.g., in Monson v. Tussaud, [18941 1 Q. B. 671, 692, 63 L. J. Q. B. 454, it is said.
"Libel... may be conveyed in some ...

permanent form. For instance, a statute,

a caricature, an effigy . . . or pictures." (Emphasis added). Also see rationale of
cases cited in note 16 supra.
23. Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLUM.
L. REV.546 (1903).
24. Broderick v. James, 3 Daly 481 (N. Y. 1871).
25. Cf. Hartman v. Winchel, 296 N. Y. 296, 300, 73 N. E. 2d 30, 32 (1947)

(concurring opinion).

26. Bryam v. Collins, 111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75 (1888); Bromage v. Prosser,
4 B. & C. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1825).
27. See Veeder, op. cit. supra note 23 at 571-73.
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continuation of the fiction that the reading from a script is in itself actionablethus not actionable per se if not read from a script-or by the creation of a new
fiction, by establishing a new tort. Rather, the defamation should be held libel
because of, the great capacity it has to harm one's reputation. It is possible
however, that the courts may hold that defamation by radio and television is libel
whether or not rehd from a script and at the same time maintain the existing
distinction if the program is kinescoped as it apparently was in the instant case.
This is not to be confused with the showing of the kinescoped program itself, which
would dearly be libel 28 Rather, it might be said that the requirement of permanence is met by the simultaneous kinescoping, it being immaterial that the viewer
was not aware that the defamatory matter was made permanent.29 In this case,
the court reached its holding by frankly recognizing that because of its great
capacity to cause harm, that at least in mass media communication, the distinction
based on form should not be controlling, in order that one may recover damages
for the injury done to his reputation without proof of a pecuniary loss. a°
Harold M. Halpern
28. By analogy to Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520,
270 N. Y. Supp. 544 (3d Dep't 1934) and Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer
Pictures Ltd., 50 T. L. R. 581, 99 A. L. R. 864 (C. A. 1934), where the courts held
that defamation by motion pictures is libel, the voice being ancillary to the

picture, which is permanent.
29. The court's reasoning in Hartman v. Winchell 296 N. Y. 296, 73 N. E.
2d 30 (1947) that the writing itself need not be published as long as there isin
fact a permanent form should be applicable to the situation where defamatory
matter is published which at the same time is made permanent. This is to be
distinguished from the situation where the embodiment in a permanent form follows publication of oral defamation.
30. Cf. Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 300, 73 N. E. 2d 30, 32 (1947)
(concurring opinion).

RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law: UnfairLabor PracticeStrikes During
Taft-Hartley Act "Cooling-Off' Period
Employees were discharged after engaging in a strike directed solely against
employer unfair labor practices. Employer refused reinstatement on the grounds:
(1) that the strike was in violation of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement; and, (2) that the strikers lost their employee status under
section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §158(d)
(1952), because the strike occurred during the sixty-day "cooling off" period
required by that section. In a proceeding for enforcement of a NLRB order directing reinstatement of these employees, held (6-3): neither the no-strike clause
of the agreement nor the loss of status provision of the statute is applicable to
strikes solely against employer unfair labor practices, and the NLRB had power
to order reinstatement. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 (1956).
The Court was unanimous in construing the no-strike clause as applicable
only to economic strikes, since the agreement, taken as a whole, dealt solely
with the economic relationship between employer and employee. They refused
to find that the employees had given up their most effective weapon against
employer interference with their rights, without clear and compelling language
in the agreement to support such an interpretation.
Even if a breach of contract had been found, a like result could have been
reached by application of the principle that a strike in breach of contract is not
grounds for employer's refusal to reinstate where the employer's actions causing
the strike were inconsistent with the purpose of the contract. United Biscuit Co.,
38 N. L. R. B. 778 (1942), enforcement granted, 128 F. 2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942).
However, the Court's view appears preferable as precedent for interpretation
of such strike waiver agreements. While no-strike agreements covering economic
conditions are valuable implements of peaceful labor settlements, unions can
hardly be expected to give up the strike weapon as a counter-measure to employer unfair practices, without exacting comparable employer concessions.
Hence, a strict interpretation of such agreements will encourage their continued
use. The view adopted by the Court supports current NLRB policy.
Although the legal right to strike is traced back to the early case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111 (Mass. 1842), the concomitant right of employees to waive their strike right by proper bargaining agreements has never been
questioned. This is so because of the public policy favoring peaceful settlement
of labor disputes. In furtherance of this policy, the NLRB formulated the doctrine that strikes in breach of such agreements are not protected activity under
the NLRA. Joseph Dyson & Sons Inc., 72 N. L. R. B. 445 (1947); Scullin

